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Abstract. Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experi-
mental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms.
Discovering its true dynamics and exploring adjustments which improve
the commitment of everyone involved could benefit scientific development
for all disciplines and consequently increase innovation in the economy
and the society. We have reported the results of an innovative experiment
developed to model peer review. We demonstrate that offering material
rewards to reviewers tends to decrease the quality and efficiency of the
reviewing process. Our findings help to discuss the viability of different
options of incentive provision, supporting the idea that journal editors
and responsible of research funding agencies should be extremely careful
in offering material incentives on reviewing, since these might undermine
moral motives which guide reviewers’ behavior.
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1 Introduction
Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in
science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms. Peer review is not just impor-
tant for scientists, but also for institutional agencies to allocate efficiently funds
and research grants and for policy makers to guarantee that taxpayer money is
well invested into a credible and well functioning system. The decisive role of
peers opinion is what guarantees that scientific innovation can be experimentally
pursued by scientists through a continuous, decentralized and distributed trial
and error process and that science can endogenously self-regulate (although in-
fluence by external constraints and policy guidelines) by determining scientists
payoffs.
With origins which dates back to 1752 when the Royal Society of London
obtained responsibility for the ”Philosophical Transactions”, this mechanism is
now under increasing strain, because of the growth of scientific publishing, the
increasing complexity of research technologies and interdisciplinary collabora-
tion in each work (Alberts et al. 2008; Grainger 2007). Not only peer review is
pivotal for scientific publications (e.g., journals and books), permitting an aver-
age of about 1.400.000 journal articles published yearly (Bjrk, Roos and Lauri
2009). It is also used to allocate research funds and grants, decide about scien-
tists recruitment and promotion and evaluate universities and research institutes
productivity, when standard bibliometric criteria do not hold.
Recently, many journal editors and observers have come to the conclusion
that some reform of peer review is needed and that the main problem is to
increase the reliability and commitment of reviewers (Hauser and Fehr 2007).
Mainstream economic theory predicts that scientists, like all, are rational agents
who follow material incentives, so the quality and efficiency problem of peer
review could be viewed as simply a problem of incentive provisions for reviewers.
Given that reviewing is not compensated, nor it is at the top of the list for
reputation building, we could argue that the commitment of reviewers could be
improved by adding material incentives.
To test this hypothesis, we have developed an innovative experiment designed
to reproduce peer review dynamics under different incentive conditions. Our
findings suggest that journal editors and responsible of research funding agencies
should be extremely careful in offering material incentives on reviewing, since
these might undermine moral motives guiding reviewers behavior. On the one
hand, as the true quality of submissions cannot be properly judged by editors
or responsible of funding agencies and there is no way for them to dig into
details about the reviewers effort in due course, a problem of moral hazard by
reviewers may arise even if material incentives are present. On the other hand,
and more importantly in our view, following the motivation crowding theory, the
presence of material incentives might undermine intrinsic pro-social motivations
of individuals by transforming reviewing into a self-interest decision problem
(e.g., Bowles 2008; Frey and Jegen 2001).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
research methods, Section 3 illustrates the results, while Section 4 discusses
them.
2 Methods
The design of our experiment aims to model the interaction of editors authors
and reviewers as a trust problem under uncertainty, where conflicting interests,
cheating and moral hazards are possible. We started from a standard experi-
mental framework, known as the “Investment Game” (Berg et al. 1995), which
we modified to look at the most important peer review mechanisms so as to test
the efficiency of different incentive schemes.
First, to observe the added value of peer review and treatment effects, we
designed a Baseline treatment where the Investment Game took place without
reviewers. Subjects were randomly paired to play in A and B positions. In each
pair, both subjects received an initial endowment (d) of 10 monetary units (MU).
First, A players decided how much of their endowment to “invest” (i) with B
players. The amount not invested remained as part of A earnings. Investments
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were then tripled and sent, in addition to the endowment, to B players, who
chose an amount to return (r) to A. The amount returned was summed with A
earnings, while the part kept by B players represented their payoff.
The investments of A players are analogous to the time and effort invested
by editors to attract articles that increase or at least maintain the reputation
of their journals. As in our game, editors face knowledge uncertainty about
the quality of submissions. On the other hand, authors, like B players in the
experiment, could honor the editors’ investment by providing work with true
and original scientific quality. Pressurized by the publish or perish rule, authors
may be tempted to cheat, e.g., by submitting research findings of lower quality
than actually claimed.
Considering that interactions were one-shot, couples were randomly assigned
each round, and there was no sanction for unfair behavior, assuming rational
choice B players had no incentive to return anything. Therefore, the only rational
strategy for A players was to keep their whole endowment. This led to the only
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, where both investments and returns
are zero and all players earn 10 MU. This outcome was sub-optimal since any
sum invested by A was tripled by the experimenter, therefore increasing the total
amount to share. Pareto optimality was given by A players investing their whole
endowment, while an outcome both optimal and fair was possible for i = 10 and
r = 20, with all players earning 20 MU.
Then, we introduced a third player into the game (player C) in the role of
the reviewer. When selected as reviewers, subjects were informed of the amount
received and returned by the B players the last time they played in the same
position. Then, reviewers were asked to rate B players’ behavior as “negative”,
“neutral” or “positive”. Reviews were displayed to A players before the subse-
quent investment decisions. As C players, the reviewers should guarantee the
editors’ investment by writing reliable evaluations of authors’ submissions. The
fact that C players knew both A investments and B returns mirrors the typi-
cal situation of reviewers who should express an evaluation matching both the
journal’s quality (i.e., the amount of the A investment) and the quality of the
contribution (i.e., the amount of B returns).
Once reviewers were introduced, we varied the incentive schemes offered to
them. In the No incentive treatment, subjects did not receive any reward for
reviewing. This treatment mimics peer review as it is now. When applied to
this interaction scheme, the incentive-based rational choice perspective predicts
that reviews should not be seriously taken into account either by editors nor by
authors, since reviewers lack motivation for their job.
In the Fixed incentive treatment, reviewers received a fixed payoff of 10 MU,
equal to A and B endowments. Fixed incentives mirror the present situation
at certain journals (e.g., the British Medical Journal), where reviewers are sup-
ported by fixed stakes (e.g., access to scholarly archives) and this could motivate
them to reciprocate by increasing their effort.
In the A incentive treatment, reviewer earnings were equal to the payoff of
A players. This alignment of interests could resolve the principal-agent problem
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between editors and reviewers, by motivating the agents (reviewers) to act on
behalf of the principals (editors) guaranteeing that the self-interest of the latter
coincides with the objectives of the former. This treatment is therefore expected
to lead to more reliable reviews and higher efficiency.
In the B incentive treatment, reviewer earnings were equal to the payoff of
B players. As each published article includes also the contribution of reviewers
in terms of feedbacks and suggestions, it is reasonable to think about measures
to share payoffs between authors and reviewers—e.g., reviewers’ names included
in the published article—although currently not explored in scientific journals.
The alignment of authors’ and reviewers’ interests was expected to determine
an exploitation of the goodwill of editors and therefore to produce less reliable
reviews and lower editors’ investment.
Subjects (N = 136) participated in the experiment held at the University
of Brescia at the end of November 2010. Participants were students recruited
across the different university faculties using the online system ORSEE (Greiner
2004). They played in groups of 27 subjects (28 in the Baseline) in one of the
above treatments for 30 periods. Couples in the Baseline and triplets in peer
review treatments were randomly rematched after each period to avoid the use
of reciprocal strategies. Subjects interacted anonymously through a computer
network using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Each session,
including reading of instructions, playing the game for 30 periods and filling in
an ex-post questionnaire, took approximatively 75 minutes. In all treatments, we
used virtual monetary units with an exchange rate of 1 MU = 2.5 Euro Cents.
Participants were paid immediately after the experiment in cash and earned
an average of 14.90 Euros. The English translation of the instructions and the
questionnaire is included in the Appendix.
3 Results
Previous experiments using the Investment Game showed that A players invested
on average between one third to half of their endowments. Returns were slightly
lower than investments, making trustful behavior not particularly profitable on
average (Berg et al. 1995; Ortmann et al. 2000). Our study replicated these
results and, consistently with previous studies which introduced reputational
motives in the investment game (Boero et al. 2009; Keser 2003), showed that peer
review improved both efficiency and cooperation dramatically. Both investments
and returns were higher in peer review treatments, with investments increasing
from an average of 3.22 MU in the Baseline up to 5.21 MU in A incentive and
returns rising from 2.00 in the Baseline to 6.87 in No incentive (Fig. 1A,B and
Tab. 1). The amounts exchanged in the first three periods of the game, when
reviewers had no previous information to evaluate, and in the last three periods,
when B players knew that no further review would take place, were not included
in the analysis.5
5 Our dataset may be accessed upon request to the corresponding author.
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Fig. 1. Average investments (A), returns (B) and cooperation index (C) by treatment
with standard error bars. Investments are represented in proportion of A endowment
(10 MU). Returns are expressed as proportion of the overall B endowment (3× amount
received +10 MU). The Cooperation Index varied from zero for highly inefficient and
inequitable outcomes to one for efficient and equitable outcomes.
Differences with the Baseline for both investments and returns were signifi-
cant for all treatments except Fixed incentive, where the difference was significant
only for returns (Tab. 2). However, significant differences also existed between
peer review treatments, especially for B returns. Both No incentive and A in-
centive led to higher returns than Fixed incentive (Wilcoxon rank sum tests
on individual averages, W = 531.0, p = 0.002 and W = 199.0, p = 0.002 re-
spectively). There were no significant differences between No incentive and A
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Baseline No inc. Fixed inc. A inc. B inc.
Mean SEM Mean SEM Mean SEM Mean SEM Mean SEM
A inv. (MU) 3.22 0.16 5.07 0.23 3.61 0.21 5.21 0.21 4.50 0.18
B ret. (MU) 2.00 0.16 6.87 0.42 3.75 0.30 6.42 0.45 4.75 0.28
B ret. (pr.) 0.09 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.19 0.01
CI 0.50 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.60 0.01 0.58 0.01
Table 1. Average investments, returns and cooperation index by treatment. Returns
are showed both as absolute figures and as proportion of B endowment.
Baseline No inc. Fixed inc. A inc.
W p W p W p W p
A invest. No inc. 212.5 0.003
Fixed inc. 341.0 0.269 508.0 0.006
A inc. 189.0 0.001 359.5 0.469 176.5 0.001
B inc. 245.5 0.013 418.0 0.180 248.0 0.022 439.5 0.099
B returns No inc. 105.0 0.000
(absolute) Fixed inc. 238.0 0.009 531.0 0.002
A inc. 90.0 0.000 385.0 0.365 199.0 0.002
B inc. 150.5 0.000 480.0 0.023 287.0 0.091 467.5 0.038
B returns No inc. 136.0 0.000
(prop.) Fixed inc. 258.0 0.022 487.0 0.017
A inc. 120.0 0.000 380.0 0.398 241.0 0.017
B inc. 173.0 0.000 450.5 0.070 301.0 0.138 438.0 0.104
CI No inc. 70.0 0.000
Fixed inc. 228.0 0.006 583.0 0.000
A inc. 20.0 0.000 452.0 0.067 133.0 0.000
B inc. 62.0 0.000 509.0 0.006 206.0 0.003 457.0 0.056
Table 2. Wilcoxon rank sum tests on differences between treatments with one tailed
p values.
incentive (W = 385.0, p = 0.365). Differences in investments were smaller, but
still remained statistically significant at 5% between No incentive and Fixed in-
centive (W = 508.0, p = 0.006) and between A incentive and Fixed incentive
(W = 176.5, p = 0.001).
To better describe the dynamics of cooperation in the peer review game, we
built a concise indicator that summarized the results of the game in a single
measure. The fundamental reason in doing this arose from the fact that, in the
Investment game, Pareto optimality depends only on A investments, but we
should also take B’s behavior into account as a critical element that determines
scientific quality. Nevertheless, Pareto optimality remains an important indicator
of the overall system efficiency in the different treatments. This is indicated
by E = i/d where i represents A’s investment and d is the endowment. This
indicator is clearly zero when A invests zero and one when A invests the whole
endowment. Following previous research (Alm˚as et al. 2010; Fehr and Schmidt
1999; Nowak et al. 2000; Rabin 1993), we took B returns into account by adopting
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Fig. 2. Cooperation index dynamics in No incentive and A incentive. The Baseline
curve at the bottom of the figure is inserted as reference.
a fairness criterion favoring outcomes where both players obtained equal payoffs
F = 1 − (|PA − PB |)/(PA + PB) where PA and PB are the payoffs earned by
A and B Players respectively. This is zero when one of the players obtains the
whole amount at stake and the other receives zero, while it becomes one when
both players obtain the same payoff. Averaging the two criteria, we defined the
cooperation index as CI = (E + F )/2. This is zero when A players invest zero
and B players return all their endowments, grows with both A investments and
a fairer distribution of final payoffs, and becomes one when As invest d and Bs
return half of their overall endowment.
The treatment with the highest CI was No incentive, which led to more co-
operative outcomes than any other treatment (Fig. 1C). Differences were statis-
tically significant at 10% with A incentive and at 5% with the other treatments.
The high CI value in No incentive was especially important since, unlike A in-
centive, reviewers had no incentive to cooperate with A players. This indicated
that material incentives, rather than guaranteeing higher reviewers’ commit-
ment, were superfluous and might even backfire by eroding the reliability of the
entire review process.
It is worth noting that the most cooperative treatments in our experiment
performed differently in the first and in the final part of the game (see Fig. 2).
In periods 4–15, the CI was 0.60 ± 0.01 in No incentive and 0.64 ± 0.01 in A
incentive, while these figures were 0.67 ± 0.01 and 0.56 ± 0.01 respectively in
periods 16–27. The differences were significant (W = 252, p = 0.026 for periods
4–15 and W = 558, p = 0.000 for periods 16–27), suggesting that material
disinterest guaranteed more robust cooperation in the long run.
In all peer review treatment, A players largely used reviewers’ ratings for
their investment decisions and systematically invested more when they received
positive reviews (Fig. 3A). There were also differences in the average return
proportion that induced negative, neutral, or positive reviews (Fig. 3B), a fact
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Fig. 3. Review effects. (A) Average investment proportion by review. (B) Average
return proportions required by reviewers to award negative, neutral or positive evalu-
ations.
that is crucial to understand cooperation differences among treatments. In No
incentive and A incentive reviewers were more selective, requiring an average
return proportion of about one third of B overall endowment to award positive
reviews. In Fixed incentive and B incentive this proportion declined instead to
one quarter or less, leaving more room for the authors’ opportunistic behavior.
A questionnaire at the end of the experiment focused on the participants’
perception of other subjects’ behavior (see Supporting Information). Participants
rated B players as more trustworthy in all peer review treatments than in the
Baseline (W = 1790.5, p = 0.061) and in No incentive than in A incentive,
although these differences were significant at only 10% (W = 447.5, p = 0.068).
Also reviewers were rated as most reliable in No incentive. Differences were
significant between No incentive and both Fixed and B incentive (W = 457, p =
0.052 and W = 457, p = 0.050, respectively), whereas they were not significant
between No incentive and A incentive (W = 376, p = 0.423).
4 Discussion
Our findings show that the most effective peer review scheme is the one cur-
rently in use where reviewers are not supported by material incentives. Its main-
tenance avoids that peer review undergoes a frame effect motivating also well
disposed reviewers to behave selfishly in turn. Questionnaire answers further
confirmed that higher trust and cooperation were guaranteed by the reviewing
scheme set up in No incentive. This is consistent with previous studies showing
that people were less committed when material incentives were added to social
interactions that were usually driven by intrinsic, materially disinterested mo-
tivations (Bowles 2008; Heyman and Ariely 2004; Vohs et al. 2006). A recent
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theory called “motivation crowding theory” has been elaborated that accounts
for a broad range of phenomena where incentives undermine intrinsic pro-social
motivations of individuals so as to dominate the traditional relative price ef-
fect (Frey and Jegen 2001). As material interests and moral motives cannot be
separated, incentives could transform interactions into a self-interest decision
problem. This would make self-interest the appropriate behavior (Bowles 2008)
and peer review would not be an exception.
The A incentive scheme, where reviewers had incentives aligned with editors,
was similarly productive, but less robust than the former. Moreover, aligned in-
centive provision is extremely difficult to implement in journals, as it requires
incentives which are sensitive to interaction outcomes. This means that the sci-
entific value of a published article should be completely assessable within peer
review interaction, as well as the effort needed for reviewing it. Unfortunately,
we know that the former can be evaluated only ex-post and in the long run
while the latter differs from subject to subject and is practically impossible to
measure. The only feasible way to add material incentives to peer review is in-
troducing fixed rewards, but our experiment showed that this scheme was the
worst in promoting cooperation.
Our experiments explain why the current practice of peer review based on
voluntary contributions is so pervasive and efficient. It is likely that this is so
because the current practice fully exploits the reciprocity motives that typically
drive human behavior in many social interactions (Gintis 2000; Ostrom and
James 2003; Sigmund 2010). Most of us take seriously reviewing and do their
best to return useful and detailed reports to authors, as we know that our peers
will do the same in turn to our benefit. Moreover, we showed that adding material
incentives is difficult and in most cases deteriorates the present situation.
This does not mean that journals, academic associations and research agen-
cies could revel in doing nothing. In our view, there are two possible lines for
improving the present situation. The first one has to do with the attempt of
valuing more the reviewing activity of scientists for their professional recognition
and reputation. The second one has more to do with improving the normative
foundations of science.
As regards to the first, everyone knows that the value and the payoff of
each publication embody comments, ideas and efforts by reviewers but are cap-
italized just by authors, as the former do not have any concrete reputational
benefit from authors publications. Our suggestion here is that journals could
improve the way reviewers’ contributions are presently acknowledged by estab-
lishing symbolic awards for reviewers, including reviewers name in each published
articles and, more importantly, defining clear rules that link the admission and
turnover of peers into their editorial boards also to excellence in reviewing. Re-
search agencies could similarly find ways to value the reviewing experience of
applicants when evaluating applications. These types of initiatives would exploit
reputational motives rather than material self-interest, and consequently would
improve cooperation without deteriorating the moral dimension behind peer re-
view. As regards to the second point, initiatives by scientific associations and
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research agencies which could promote intrinsic motivations and the moral di-
mension of science, by emphasizing the relevance of reviewing should be taken.
An example could be teaching reviewing and its moral importance in science in
PhD courses. Obviously, given that our findings help to establish what should
not be done, further research is needed that examines which initiatives need to
be taken to improve peer review.
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